.
We rst consider the message transfer problem when the network can lose packets. One of the main factors in this case is whether the protocol is allowed a grace period" after a crash, during which messages that are transmitted do not necessarily have to be delivered. Our results for this case are summarized in Fig. 3 . They imply that message transfer is possible if the network is FIFO and the protocol is allowed a variable length grace period. However, message transfer is not possible if the network is non-FIFO or the grace period allowed the protocol is xed. In more detail, we show that if the grace period must be xed, then there is no protocol for this problem, even if the network is FIFO and the message delivery need not be. We further show that if the grace period is allowed to be variable, then there is a protocol for this problem that guarantees FIFO delivery of messages if the network is FIFO but can lose packets. If the network is not FIFO then there is no protocol for this problem.
Next we consider networks that do not lose packets. We show that in non-FIFO networks, achieving FIFO message delivery is impossible in the presence of node crashes, even if the liveness property to be satis ed is very weak. In the other three cases, there are simple protocols for message transfer; see Fig. 4 .
The previous impossibility results for message transfer rely on the network having unbounded capacity to store up old packets. We also consider the case where the capacity the number of packets that can be in transit at any given time of the network is bounded. For this case, we h a v e a message transfer protocol which can withstand crashes without stable storage. The protocol works even if the network can lose packets and is not FIFO but it is ine cient if the capacity is large. The protocol can be made more e cient for any capacity when the network is FIFO.
The statements of several of our impossibility results formalize beliefs held by practitioners. Known folk" theorems in the practical community argue that unless some non-trivial timing assumptions are satis ed, nodes must keep connection records inde nitely and possess stable storage that can withstand crashes cf. 29, Ch 6 . Roughly speaking, the argument is based on the delayed duplicates" attack, in which old duplicate packets somehow collect in the network and are then delivered to a node in such a w a y as to trick i t i n to thinking a connection is open when it is not. It is true that connectionless network protocols do not detect and eliminate duplicates, but where can these duplicates come from and how can they be collected? For any reasonable type of hardware, duplicates are only caused by some protocol at some layer retransmitting a packet. The popular network protocol IP does not itself do retransmissions 3 ; thus the only other possibility is that they come from the data link layer which is concerned with reliable transmission between adjacent nodes over a physical link. But duplicates at the data link layer are easily avoided. 4 Furthermore, ber optic networks of the near future may not even have a data link layer. Thus the assumption of arbitrarily delayed duplicates collecting in the network is too pessimistic in many reasonable situations.
Our results imply that even under a seemingly more benign assumption about the network namely, n o s p o n taneous duplicates, it is in many cases possible to collect duplicates so as to attack protocols for incarnation management and message transfer. This holds even for relaxed protocol requirements, including the existence of a grace period and the possibility o f releasing a connection upon network misbehavior.
Our results that assume a non-FIFO network are clearly applicable to the environment o f a connectionless network layer, where packets are routed independently. The results that assume a FIFO network layer are theoretically interesting since the lower bounds are made technically stronger. They also have practical relevance to a connection-oriented network layer, which manages connections between hosts, but at the network level, with speci c control over routing decisions; in some cases, when a xed route is used, packets arrive in FIFO order. They are also relevant to data link initialization procedures, which provide a reliable connection between nodes that are physically connected. The protocol for bounded capacity networks is particularly relevant to the data link layer, since the capacity o f a p h ysical link will generally be constant.
The other protocols serve more as counter-examples and show that speci c assumptions used to prove an impossibility result cannot be relaxed.
Connection management has been studied intensively in the practical literature and many ingenious protocols have been suggested e.g., 12, 1 3 , 28, 29, 31, 3 4 , 35 . All these protocols rely on some combination of timers, packet delay bounds, synchronized clocks and unique incarnation identi ers; it has been argued informally that some combination of these assumptions is necessary 35 . Our work complements these protocols by identifying precisely which assumptions on the system are necessary and su cient, and exactly which requirements from the protocol it is impossible to achieve in certain cases. Other work that complements ours is the vast literature on veri cation of communication protocols, including, for example, 18, 2 0 , 26 . These papers concentrate on verifying known protocols rather than investigating whether the assumptions they rely on are necessary.
There is some prior work on impossibility results for connection management. Our impossibility result for message transfer, when a xed grace period is allowed, on a FIFO network that can lose packets improves the result in 17 , which assumed the stronger progress property that starting immediately after the last crash, all messages transmitted must be delivered. Belsnes 11 studies how many packet exchanges are necessary in order to manage incarnations, under various requirements and assumptions. LeLann and LeGo 21 show that a connection cannot be established by protocols of a particular form. Other theoretical studies of communication protocols have mostly concentrated on the data link layer 1, 3, 1 7 , 19, 23, 2 5 , 30, 33 . Most of this work concerns implementing protocols using bounded size packets, an issue we do not address. Our protocols for message transfer on bounded-capacity FIFO networks use an idea from self-stabilizing protocols for cleaning the system with a new label. This idea was rst employed in 15 and later used in 2, 8 , 1 6 .
Our impossibility result for amnesic incarnation management protocols requires that the hosts discard all information after a connection is released. This condition does not allow hosts to maintain, e.g., a single global counter that is common to all connections a host might h a v e. Following our work, and using a very similar framework, it was shown 7, 6 that in this case, a three-way handshake incarnation management protocol is possible, but there is no two-way handshake protocol unless some information is maintained for each possible connection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our model. Section 3 concerns the problems caused by di erent incarnations of the same connection, while Section 4 includes the message transfer results. We conclude, in Section 5, with a discussion of our results and directions for future research.
De nitions
In this section we present our model of computation. Then we describe the architecture of the system, which consists of two hosts, two nodes one per host, and a network connecting the two nodes. Our description of the problem is somewhat simpli ed since we ignore two-way tra c at the message level one node only transmits messages and the other node only delivers messages. We then present a modular technique for proving impossibility in many situations, called pumping.
I O Automata
In this subsection, we brie y describe the input-output automaton model 24 , as simpli ed for our purposes. Each system component is modeled by an automaton. The automaton is a state machine whose state transitions are labeled with actions. If there is a transition from a state labeled with an action, then that action is enabled in that state. The actions of an automaton are classi ed as either internal or external. External actions model communication with the environment and are further classi ed as either input providing stimuli from the environment or output generating information to the environment. Since the component has no control over when inputs occur, each input action is enabled in every state. Internal actions are private to the component, i.e., not visible to its environment.
An execution of an automaton is an alternating sequence of states and actions, beginning with an initial state, in which each action is enabled in the previous state and each state change correctly re ects the transition relation for the intervening action. An occurrence of an action in an execution is an event. An execution is fair if every output or internal action that is continuously enabled eventually occurs. Informally, an execution is fair if the automaton eventually gets to perform a pending output or internal action and is not, say, s w amped with inputs. We will require liveness properties only of fair executions. A fair schedule of an automaton is the sequence of events in a fair execution.
The system as a whole is also modeled by an automaton, the automaton resulting from the composition of the components. In order for the composition to be de ned, each action must be shared by at most two automata, and then the action must be an input of one and an output of the other. The state set of the composition is the Cartesian product of the state sets of the component automata. There is a transition from state s 0 of the composition to state s labeled with action if and only if 1 is enabled in each component o f s 0 that corresponds to an automaton with that action, and 2 each component i n s correctly re ects the corresponding transition for or is unchanged if the corresponding automaton lacks . Each action of the composition retains its previous classi cation as input, output, or internal, except that an action that is input to one component and output to another becomes internal.
We use the following notation: If is a schedule of a composite automaton A and X is a component o f A , then jX denotes the restriction of to actions of X.
System Architecture
The system consists of two nodes S sender and R receiver, a host at each node, and a network connecting S and R. S, R and the network are explicitly modeled as I O automata. 
S

De ning the Network
The actions of the network are X is either S or R and Y is the other node:
input Send X p, X sends packet p, output Recv X p, packet p is received by X, input Losep, packet p in transit is lost, and output NProblem X , X is given an indication that there is a problem in the network.
A state of the network is two sets of packets, one set P SR for packets from S to R and another set P RS for packets from R to S. The e ect of a Send S p action is to add p to the set P SR . A Recv S p action is enabled whenever p is in the set P RS ; the e ect of a Recv S p or Losep action is to remove p from the set P RS if it is in the set. A packet is in transit from R to S i f i t i s i n P RS . Analogous de nitions are obtained by reversing S and R. We h a v e just described a network that can lose packets|whether a packet is delivered or lost depends on which e v ent happens rst, Recv or Lose.
We will only require correctness of S and R for schedules of the system in which the network behaves properly". We n o w de ne the various types of networks studied in this paper. NA stands for network assumption.
An automaton with the above actions is a network if every schedule satis es NA1, NA2, and NA3 below:
NA1. There exists a one-to-one function causep SR from the set of Recv R events in the schedule to the set of Send S events in the schedule such that if causep SR Recv R p = Send S p 0 , then p = p 0 i.e., p and p 0 have the same contents and Send S p 0 precedes Recv R p and analogously for packets from R to S. I.e., the network does not duplicate or corrupt packets, nor deliver spurious packets.
NA2
. If the schedule is fair and if there is an in nite number of Send S events, then there is an in nite number of Recv R events and analogously for packets from R to S. I.e., the network delivers in nitely many packets in each direction. 5 NA3. For every pre x of the schedule and X 2 f S; Rg:
1. if = 0 NProblem X for some 0 , then P X 0 jN is true. 2. if P X jN is true, then the next output event b y the network involving X in the schedule is NProblem X .
The NProblem S action of the network will be triggered depending on some predicate P S on sequences of network actions that gives a necessary and su cient condition for the event NProblem S to occur. For example, P S might be that ten packets in a row are lost going from S to R. Similarly, the predicate P R controls the occurrence of NProblem R . Throughout this paper, we will only consider predicates P X that are loss2-only, meaning that P X is not true unless there have been at least two Lose events in either direction since the last NProblem X event. Thus, the network ignores minor uctuations which cause single packets to be lost, and triggers an NProblem only when things get worse. 6 A network is FIFO if every schedule satis es NA4 below; otherwise it is non-FIFO. 
De ning Incarnation Management
Ideally what happens is that the host at S requests a connection Req-Con S , S communicates this to R and R checks with its host Req-Con R . If R's host is agreeable Con R , R communicates this to S, who then tells its host Con S . Now the host at S transmits messages Transmit and S and R run a message transfer protocol so that they are delivered to R's host Deliver. The host at either S or R can unilaterally decide to end the connection Req-Dis S or Req-Dis R ; once S and R have terminated the connection, the hosts are noti ed Dis R and Dis S . There is a third way that a connection can be released: if the network is experiencing problems, either S or R is noti ed NProblem S and NProblem R and then they are free to decide whether to terminate any existing connection.
We n o w proceed more formally. The actions of S are input Req-Con S , request from the host at S to establish a connection with R, output Con S , indication to the host at S that the connection is established, at least as far as S is concerned, input Transmitm, the host at S wants to transmit message m to the host at R, output Send S p, send packet p over the network to R, input Recv S p, receive packet p from R over the network, input Req-Dis S , request from the host at S to disconnect the connection, output Dis S , indication to the host at S that the connection is disconnected, input NProblem S , indication that there is a problem in the network, input Crash S optional, S crashes and recovers, and internal Step S , S takes a local step.
The actions of R are output Req-Con R , query to host at R whether it is willing to establish a connection with S note that this is not symmetric, in that Req-Con R is an output from the host at R, while Req-Con S is an input to the host at S, input Con R , indication from the host at R that it is willing to establish the connection note that this is not symmetric, in that Con R is an input to the host at R, while Con S is an output from the host at S, output Deliverm, deliver message m to the host at R, as well as actions Send R p, Recv R p, Req-Dis R , Dis R , NProblem R , Crash R optional, and
Step R , which are completely analogous to those of S.
When we consider the case that nodes can crash, we use the Crash actions noted as optional above. To model the lack of stable storage, we require that there be a unique state rec S of S that results from the Crash S action and analogously for R. No matter what the state of S is immediately before a crash, it always returns to state rec S immediately after the crash.
We will require a certain pattern of interactions between the hosts and the nodes. We now specify this pattern, called well-formedness". De ne the host interface of a schedule to be its restriction to the actions of the hosts, i.e., Req-Con, Con, Transmit, Deliver, Req-Dis, and Dis but not Crash, NProblem, Send or Recv. A sequence of host events is de ned to be well-formed if it can be extended to satisfy the following. Partition the sequence into sections, separated by Req-Con S events. Each section that begins with Req-Con S , which i s every section except possibly the rst, is called an incarnation. If the rst section is not an incarnation, then it must consist only of Dis events. Each incarnation must satisfy the following.
The restriction of the incarnation to actions of the host at S has the form 7
Req-Con S Con S Transmit Req-Dis S Dis + S . The restriction of the incarnation to actions of the host at R has the form Dis R Req-Con R Con R Deliver Req-Dis R Dis + R . If Req-Con R occurs, it follows Req-Con S , and if Con S occurs, it follows Con R . So if we restrict to just Req-Con and Con actions, the sequence up to Con S is Req-Con S Req-Con R Con R Con S . This is called the real-time overlap condition.
The disconnects in the rst section would be due to Crashes that occur initially: below w e will require a Crash to cause the incarnation to disconnect, but since crashed nodes cannot tell if there was an incarnation in progress or not, they can initiate a disconnect procedure even if there is no incarnation in progress. This is also the reason for the appearance of Dis + at the end of the conditions for S and R and the appearance of Dis R at the beginning of the condition for R. Since an incarnation is de ned to begin with Req-Con S , there are no Dis S events at the beginning of the condition for S.
If an incarnation includes Dis S and Dis R , then it is complete. If an incarnation includes Con S but no Dis or Req-Dis, then it is open, and messages can be transferred. An incarnation in which one side wants to connect or disconnect but the other side has not yet done so is neither complete nor open.
We n o w de ne properties of schedules that re ect the assumptions on the hosts HA* and requirements on the protocol IM*.
HA1. The hosts preserve w ell-formedness of the host interface. I.e., if the schedule is wellformed so far, then any step by a host results in a schedule that is also well-formed.
IM1. The protocol preserves well-formedness of the host interface.
Next we put safety requirements on the message transfer function. IM2 states that every message delivered was previously transmitted within the same incarnation; IM3 is the FIFO property.
IM2. There is a one-to-one function causem from the set of Deliver events to the set of Next we require that every Dis S event can be attributed to a unique Req-Dis or Crash or NProblem event, and the same for every Dis R . I.e., the protocol cannot simply decide to issue disconnects for no good reason. A natural notion would be that the event triggering a disconnect of an incarnation must occur in that incarnation. However, a crash might occur at R just before an incarnation starts at S and this crash should be allowed to close the incarnation.
Thus our de nition is looser. We only present impossibility results for the cases when crashes can occur; in our protocols, all of which are for no-crash cases, disconnects are only triggered by e v ents in the same incarnation.
IM4. There is a one-to-one mapping from Dis S events to previous Req-Dis, Crash, and NProblem events, and the same for Dis R events. This is the no unwarranted disconnects condition.
Our restriction to loss2-only predicates for the occurrence of NProblem implies that the loss of only one packet cannot cause a connection to be closed. We also require that any open incarnation must be closed in response to a crash. The motivation for this condition is that the most likely condition desired of the message transfer aspect of connection management is that the sequence of messages delivered in an incarnation should be a pre x of the sequence transmitted and not have a n y messages skipped in the middle. In order to ensure this property in the face of crashes, an ongoing incarnation would have to disconnect in case crucial information for maintaining the pre x property had been lost.
IM5. If the schedule is fair, and if a Crash event occurs in an incarnation, then the incarnation is nite.
Since a node does not know whether an incarnation was in progress when it recovers from a crash, it must disconnect even if no incarnation is open.
Finally we h a v e the liveness conditions, both for connecting and disconnecting IM6 and for delivering messages IM7. IM6 depends on R's host eventually responding to requests to open a connection, so we make a second host assumption, HA2.
HA2. If the schedule is fair, then every Req-Con R event i s e v entually followed by a Con R or Dis R event.
IM6. If the schedule is fair and consists of a nite number of incarnations, then the last incarnation is either complete or open.
Well-formedness alone guarantees that the schedule will consist of a nite or in nite sequence of complete incarnations, and if the number is nite, then there might be a nal incomplete incarnation. IM6 says that neither the host nor the protocol can stop playing" at inopportune times. It is possible for an in nite schedule to consist of a nite number of incarnations, where the last incarnation is in nitely long; it's important to allow for the possibility of an in nitely long incarnation in order to state liveness properties for the message transfer of the style of eventual delivery: e.g., in any incarnation with no Dis event, every message transmitted is delivered. Any application-speci c liveness properties on the type of message delivery to be supported should go here. For the lower bounds, we w ould like a w eak condition that is still strong enough for our results to hold. We use IM7 below, but rst we m ust make a de nition. A schedule is ping-pong if the scheduling discipline for packet sends and receives in its associated execution is as follows. Every packet that is sent is received before the next packet is sent thus no packet is lost. Furthermore, after each state in which both R and S have a Send action enabled, the next Send that occurs is at the node which did not perform the previous Send.
IM7. If the schedule is nite and is of the form Req-Con S , where contains no Crash, no Req-Dis, no NProblem, at most one Lose, and at least one Transmit, then there exists an extension Deliverm of the schedule such that m is the last message transmitted in , is ping-pong, and contains no Crash, Req-Dis, NProblem, or Transmitm e v ents.
IM7 says that if we are in an open incarnation where everything is behaving beautifully, the latest pending Transmit must have a Deliver.
We n o w de ne the various types of incarnation management protocols. Let N be a certain type of network, i.e., every schedule of N satis es NA1, NA2, NA3, and possibly NA4 and or NA5.
The composition of S, R, and N forms an incarnation management protocol for that type of network if every schedule of the composition with no Crash events satis es the following implication: If HA1 and HA2 are true, then IM1, IM2, IM4, IM6 and IM7 are true.
An incarnation management protocol is FIFO if IM3 is added to the list of IM properties in the above implication.
A possibly FIFO incarnation management protocol is crash resilient if Crash events are allowed to occur and IM5 is added to the list of IM properties in the above implication.
De ning Message Transfer
When focusing on the message transfer problem, the incarnation management model is simplied by considering only the actions Transmit, Deliver, Send, Recv, Step, Crash, and optionally Lose.
We n o w de ne the various types of message transfer protocols. Let N be a certain type of network, i.e., every schedule of N satis es NA1, NA2, NA3, and possibly NA4 and or NA5.
The composition of S, R, and N forms a crash-resilient message transfer protocol for that type of network if every schedule of the composition satis es MT1:
MT1. There is a one-to-one function causem from the set of Deliver events in the sched- MT3. If the schedule is fair and in nite but only has a nite number of Crash events, then every Transmit event following the nal Crash event has a matching Deliver event.
Let t be a nonnegative i n teger. A possibly FIFO crash resilient message transfer protocol is exactly-once with t-xed grace period if every schedule satis es MT4: MT4. If the schedule is fair, then every Transmitm e v ent that is not one of the rst t Transmit events after a Crash S or Crash R event has a matching Deliverm w.r.t. causem.
I.e., following a crash, up to t messages that are transmitted may fail to be delivered, but after that, the messages must be delivered. Condition MT4 with t = 0 is the same as condition MT3.
Let t be a function from system states to nonnegative i n tegers. A possibly FIFO crashresilient message transfer protocol is exactly-once with t-variable grace period if every schedule satis es MT5:
MT5. Suppose the schedule is fair. Choose an aribtrary Transmitm e v ent. Let be the latest preceding crash event and c be the system state immediately after in the corresponding execution. In case there is no such , c is the initial system state. If Transmitm is not one of the rst tc T ransmit events after , then it has a matching Deliverm w.r.t. causem. This condition is similar to MT4, except that the number of messages after a crash that may fail to be delivered can depend on the system state. Intuitively, w e allow the number of messages lost to depend on the behavior of the network in the execution leading to this state 8 .
A possibly FIFO crash-resilient message transfer protocol is at-most-once if every schedule satis es MT6 a very weak condition:
MT6. If the schedule is fair and has only a nite number of Crash events but an in nite numb e r o f T ransmit events, then there is an in nite number of Deliver events.
Pumping
Pumping is used in two results concerning incarnation management Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and two results concerning message transfer Theorems 4.1 and 4.4. This technique is a slight generalization of the main technique used to prove the impossibility result of 17 . Pumping does not rely on non-FIFO or losing behavior of the network, although it does assume node crashes. We begin with a speci c reference" execution and modify it so that at the end of the modi ed execution a sequence of packets is in transit from S to R that will cause R to mimic its behavior in the original execution but without any further activity b y S . W e obtain the desired sequence of packets in transit by strictly alternating between S and R and each time replaying a little more of each one's history from the reference schedule and crashing the other one thus pumping up" the sequence of packets in transit.
Let P be any one of the crash-resilient protocols de ned above, either for incarnation Assume further that 8 Variations similar in avor to the requirement that a protocol is bounded" were studied in 30, 33 . is nite; is ping-pong; begins with Crash S Crash R ; has no Lose events; when restricted to host actions begins with Dis S and Dis R in some order, if P is an incarnation management protocol.
Let S 1 ; R 1 ; : : : ; S k ; R k be the sequence of packets sent i n which is also the sequence in which they are received, by the ping-pong property, divided into maximal length subsequences S i and R i such that all the packets in S i are sent b y S and all the packets in R i are sent b y R . For example, pump ; 3 = sender ; 1 receiver ; 1 sender ; 2 receiver ; 2 sender ; 3 receiver ; 3. In words and ignoring host events: S crashes and sends all the packets in S 1 . Then R crashes and as it receives the packets in S 1 which are in transit, R sends all the packets in R 1 . Then S crashes again and sends all the packets in S 1 , and as it receives the packets in R 1 which are in transit, S sends all the packets in S 2 . Then R crashes again and as it receives the packets in S 1 and S 2 which are in transit, R sends all the packets in R 1 and R 2 . Then S crashes again and sends all the packets in S 1 , and as it receives the packets in R 1 and R 2 which are in transit, S sends S 2 and S 3 . Then R crashes again and as it receives the packets in S 1 , S 2 and S 3 which are in transit, R sends all the packets in R 1 , R 2 and R 3 . The next lemma generalizes this example. Lemma 2.1 For any i, 1 i k, a pump ; i , 1 sender ; i is a schedule satisfying the same network and host assumptions as , and the packets S 1 ; : : : ; S i are i n t r ansit after it. b pump ; i is a schedule satisfying the same network and host assumptions as , and the packets R 1 ; : : : ; R i are i n t r ansit after it.
Proof: By induction on i. When i = 1, a and b are obvious. Suppose the inductive hypothesis is true for i , 1 1. a To show that pump ; i,1 sender ; i i s a s c hedule, it is su cient to show that all the packets received in sender ; i, namely R 1 through R i,1 , are in transit after pump ; i , 1. This is true by the inductive h ypothesis for b and the fact that NProblem never occurs since there are no Lose events. S 1 ; : : : ; S i are in transit at the end of pump ; i , 1 sender ; i because they are sent during sender ; i, but none of them is received since there are no actions of R in sender ; i.
Clearly none of the network assumptions satis ed by is violated; HA1 is satis ed because of the Dis events at the beginning of ; HA2 is vacuously true because the schedule is not fair packets are in transit at the end of . b Recall that pump ; i = pump ; i , 1 sender ; i receiver ; i. To show that pump ; i i s a s c hedule, it is su cient t o s h o w that all the packets received in receiver ; i, namely S 1 through S i , are in transit after pump ; i , 1 sender ; i. This is true by part a. R 1 ; : : : ; R i are in transit at the end of pump ; i because they are sent during receiver ; i, but none of them is received since there are no actions of S in receiver ; i.
Clearly none of the network assumptions satis ed by are violated; HA1 is satis ed because of the Dis events at the beginning of ; HA2 is vacuously true because the schedule is not fair packets are in transit.
Corollary 2.2 pump ; k sender ; k satis es the following.
1. It is a schedule.
2. S and R are in the same states after it as they are at the end of . 4. S 1 ; : : : ; S k are i n t r ansit after it.
5. It satis es the same network and host assumptions as .
Proof: 1. By Lemma 2.1, the packets R 1 ; : : : ; R k are in transit at the end of pump ; k, and thus pump ; k sender ; k i s a s c hedule.
2. Since pump ; k ends in receiver k , which i s j R , and begins with Crash R , R is in the same state at the end of pump ; k as it is at the end of . Since R takes no steps in sender ; k, R is still in the same state at the end of pump ; k sender ; k. By de nition of sender ; k, S is in the same state at the end of pump ; k sender ; k a s i t i s a t t h e e n d of .
3. By construction, no packets are lost.
4. Since R takes no steps in pump ; k and no packets are lost, S 1 ; : : : S k are in transit after pump ; k sender ; k. 5 . Clearly none of the network assumptions satis ed by are violated; HA1 is satis ed because of the Dis events at the beginning of ; HA2 is vacuously true because the schedule is not fair packets are in transit.
Incarnation Management
In this section we i n v estigate the memory requirements for incarnation management. The requirements are to open and close connections correctly and to distinguish between messages belonging to di erent incarnations. We rst study incarnation management when crashes are possible but nodes do not have stable storage. We then investigate the issue of incarnation management when crashes do not occur, but no state information is preserved between di erent incarnations of the same connection.
Crashes are Possible
We present t w o impossibility results for incarnation management when nodes can crash but have no stable storage. They both indicate that connection management is not possible; they di er in the particular bad behavior exhibited and the particular restrictions placed on the structure of the protocol.
The rst result, Theorem 3.1, shows that even if the network is completely reliable, never losing packets and delivering them in FIFO order, there is no protocol. The contradiction is reached by showing that any proposed protocol can be forced into violating the real-time overlap condition. Note that NProblem events never occur since no packets are lost. Proof: Suppose in contradiction there is one. We claim there exists a nite ping-pong schedule beginning with Crash S Crash R whose restriction to host actions begins with Dis events for S and R in some order and ends with Req-Con S Req-Con R Con R Con S Transmitm Deliverm Req-Dis S Dis X Dis Y for some m where X = S and Y = R or vice versa. We n o w justify this claim. Since Crashes and Req-Con S are inputs, they can happen at any time; IM5 implies that the Dis events follow the initial Crashes; Req-Con S is a possible input; IM6 implies that Req-Con R occurs; Con R is a possible input; IM6 implies that Con S occurs; Transmitm is a possible input; IM7 implies that Deliverm occurs; Req-Dis S is a possible input; and IM6 implies that the Dis events occur. The schedule can be forced to be ping-pong by using the appropriate policy for delivering packets.
By Corollary 2.2 the pumping technique, pump ; k sender ; k i s a s c hedule that satis es HA1, HA2 and NA1 through NA5. Thus, by the assumed correctness of the protocol, it should also satisfy IM1, preserving well-formedness. However, in the su x sender ; k, S opens a connection without R doing so, violating the real-time overlap condition of wellformedness.
While the above result shows a violation of the speci cation for incarnation management, one might argue that opening a one-sided" connection is not so bad. In particular, since R does not establish a connection R is not receiving any wrong data. We remark that it is also possible to apply the pumping in reverse and trick R instead of S. In this case we will obtain a schedule whose su x, restricted to host events, is Req-Con S Con S Transmitm Req-Dis S Dis S Req-Con R Con R Deliverm Dis R . Note that this also violates the real-time overlap condition of well-formedness IM1, but it does not violate the message grouping condition IM2.
This reasoning motivates our second impossibility result, which shows that any nite-state protocol can be tricked into fusing together two separate connections at S into one at R. That is, messages from an earlier incarnation are delivered during a later incarnation, thus violating the message grouping property. This is a severe violation since di erent incarnations can be established on behalf of completely di erent application programs. These results rely on the network losing packets.
An incarnation management protocol is nite-state if both S and R are nite-state machines. We assume there are at least two distinct messages in the message alphabet. Intuitively, the proof proceeds by using the pumping technique to build another schedule such that all the packets sent b y S in are in transit at the end of the new schedule. We then lose the subsequence S 2 ; S 3 of packets from the middle. As a result, when the remaining sequence is delivered, R establishes a connection and delivers m 1 ; : : : m k , 1 ; m 0 l in the same incarnation, violating IM2, the message grouping condition. The details follow.
Note that 0 , the result of concatenating the pre x of up to just before Transmitm k with the su x of starting with Transmitm 0 l i s a s c hedule, since the system state in is the same at both points namely, S is in q S , R is in q R , and no packets are in transit.
By Corollary 2.2 the pumping technique, pump ; k sender ; k i s a s c hedule. Corollary 2.2 implies that at the end of pump ; k sender ; k the sequence S 1 ; S 2 ; S 3 ; S 4 of packets is in transit from S to R. Extend pump ; k sender ; k b y appending a Lose event for every packet in S 2 and S 3 . Then let NProblem S and or NProblem R occur if the predicates P S and or P R are true. Then append Crash R .
Finally, deliver the packets in S 1 ; S 4 to R, appropriately interleaved with output actions of R i.e., Req-Con R , Send R and a Con R response from R's host, so as to mimic R's behavior in 0 . R has incorrectly combined the delivery of m 1 ; : : : m k , 1 with the delivery of m 0 l , data sent in distinct incarnations, violating IM2.
A similar impossibility result can be proved for protocols that handles every message as a black-box". In such a protocol, the state of the sender, the receiver, and the network immediately following the transmission of a message can depend on any aspect of the execution so far, except for the contents of the messages transmitted so far. Thus, in nitely many states are allowed. Nevertheless, a technique similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 can be used to fuse two incarnations into a single incarnation at R, during which a sequence of messages that was not transmitted in either of the original incarnations is delivered.
No Crashes But No Storage Between Incarnations
We n o w consider a well-behaved system in which nodes do not crash; thus there are no Crash actions. However, we do not allow the nodes to keep information in between incarnations of a connection. Formalizing this condition takes some work in order to prevent a protocol from cheating" by storing incarnation information in packets that are in the network. We assume that S's state contains a queue of outgoing packets that are waiting to be introduced into the network, and the same for R. The next theorem is proved by stealing" packets. We take a speci c reference" execution and we replay successively longer pre xes of the reference execution. Each replay ends with the loss of a di erent packet. Because the protocol must tolerate the loss of a single packet, it must gracefully nish any pending task. Yet it is possible that the lost packet was not lost but only delayed in the non-FIFO network. Thus we can steal a single packet from each replay and keep it in the network. Then we deliver the packets we h a v e collected to the receiver, tricking it into acting as if the reference execution is executed. Proof: Assume in contradiction there is such a protocol. We claim there exists a ping-pong schedule with no Lose events whose restriction to host actions is Req-Con S Req-Con R Con R Con S Transmitm Deliverm for some message m. W e n o w justify this claim. Since Req-Con S is an input, it can happen any time; IM6 implies that Req-Con R occurs; Con R is an input; IM6 implies that Con S occurs; Transmitm is an input; IM7 implies that Deliverm occurs. The schedule can be forced to be ping-pong by using the appropriate policy for delivering packets. We n o w show that there is an amnesic FIFO incarnation management protocol when the network is FIFO but can lose messages. Moreover this protocol uses bounded memory and only releases incarnations if explicitly requested to do so by either host; i.e., it doesn't depend on any NProblem events. The message transfer liveness requirement satis ed is that in an in nite incarnation of a fair schedule, the sequence of messages delivered is equal to the sequence transmitted.
Roughly speaking the incarnation management protocol synchronizes S and R on the incarnation by using the header 2 for packets that indicate the opening of a connection. Then, similarly to 10 , the alternating bits 0 and 1 are used within an incarnation, both to transfer data items and to synchronize disconnections. More details follow.
When Req-Con S occurs, S repeatedly sends open with header 2 until receiving an acknowledgment. When R receives open,2 for the rst" time i.e., the most recent header received was not 2, it performs Req-Con R ; when Con R occurs, then R repeatedly sends ack,2. When S receives ack,2 for the rst" time, it performs Con S and sets its header to 1. When Transmitm occurs, S adds m to its bu er unless the bu er holds dis, indicating that disconnection is underway due to a Req-Dis R .
To transfer the next message m in the bu er which could be dis, S negates the current header and repeatedly sends m with the new header until receiving an acknowledgment; data messages are sent with alternating headers 0 and 1. When R receives a packet m; h for the rst" time, it performs Deliverm and repeatedly sends an acknowledgment with header h. When S receives an acknowledgment for the current header, it goes to the next message. If Req-Dis R occurs, R changes the contents of the acknowledgment packets it is sending to hold dis. I f S gets a dis from R or Req-Dis S occurs, it sets its bu er to dis; note that a dis packet can also serve a s a n a c knowledgment for the current header. When R receives dis for the rst" time, it performs Dis R and repeatedly sends an ordinary acknowledgment. When S receives an acknowledgment for the current dis message, it performs Dis S .
Theorem 3.4 There is an amnesic FIFO incarnation management protocol for FIFO losing networks that does not rely on NProblem.
The protocol requires R to continue sending acknowledgments for the packets it receives even after Dis R and before the next incarnation begins. Note that such a b e h a vior does not violate the amnesic property of the system because R does not need to have a n y information on the closed connection in order to acknowledge incoming packets 10 . It can be shown that such behavior is necessary in any protocol for this problem 4 .
Note that the above protocol uses a small number of headers. Since the above protocol assumes that the network is FIFO, it also tolerates duplicate packets.
We n o w discuss the no-loss column in Fig. 2 . The above protocol will obviously still work if the network does not lose any packets. It can also be modi ed to work even if the network is non-FIFO, as long as packets are not lost. The transformation consists of making sure that only one packet is ever in transit at a time, which can be done since packets are not lost and nodes do not crash 27 . In such cases, the network is essentially FIFO.
Message Transfer
We n o w consider the problem of recovering from crashes while guaranteeing some sort of reliable message transfer within a single in nitely long incarnation. We are interested in whether or not stable storage is required in the presence of crashes 11 . T h us throughout this section we assume nodes can crash.
We rst investigate message transfer when the capacity i s u n bounded, an assumption that approximates the situation in a wide-area network. Section 4.1 studies networks that can lose packets and Section 4.2 those that do not. We then consider, in Section 4.3, the situation when the capacity of the network is bounded.
Losing Networks
We n o w consider networks that can lose packets. We allow a message-transfer protocol to have a grace period" after a crash during which messages need not be delivered. If the length of the grace period in terms of the number of messages that don't have to be delivered is xed, then there is no protocol, even if the network is FIFO. However, if the length of the grace period can depend on the current state of the system i.e., is variable", then there is a protocol if and only if the network is FIFO. By Corollary 2.2 the pumping technique, pump ; k sender ; k i s a s c hedule. Corollary 2.2 also implies that at the end of pump ; k sender ; k, S and R are in the same states as they are at the end of . The su x sender ; k contains a Crash S event, no further crashes, and t + 1 T ransmit events.
Let pump ; k sender ; k 1 be a fair schedule such that 1 has no Crash and no Transmit events and begins with Lose events for all packets in transit at the end of pump ; k sender ; k. By MT4, there must be a Deliverm t+1 e v ent i n 1 to match the last Transmit event in pump ; k sender ; k. Since all the packets received in 1 were sent i n 1 and S and R are in the same states at the end of as at the end of pump ; k sender ; k, 1 is also a schedule. But in this schedule, a duplicate message is delivered, namely m t+1 , violating MT1.
Note that the proof of Theorem 4.1 no longer holds when the notion of a grace period is modi ed as above. Since the number of messages not delivered during the grace period is not bounded a priori, the value of t that guarantees delivery after the initial crashes of S and R may not be big enough to guarantee delivery after the crashes in the pumping technique.
In fact, as we n o w show, for losing networks there is an exactly-once protocol with tvariable grace period if the underlying network is FIFO. tc is one greater than the number of packets in transit in c, the system state after a crash. The protocol is an adaptation of a self-stabilizing algorithm from 16 .
The protocol works as follows. Initially and after a crash, S has an empty bu er and sends start with header 0. When Transmitm occurs, S adds m to its bu er. To transfer the next message m in the bu er, S increments its header by 1 and repeatedly sends m with that header until receiving an acknowledgment for that header. The rst time R receives a packet initially or after a crash, R remembers the header and sends an acknowledgment for that header, but does not deliver the message. Subsequently, whenever R receives a packet with a certain header for the rst" time i.e., the packet's header is di erent from the remembered header, R delivers the message in the packet as well as acknowledging it and remembers this header as the last one received. We n o w show that the assumption that the network provides FIFO delivery of packets is essential in order to obtain a protocol, even if the length of the grace period can depend on the state of the system after the crash and even if the protocol need not maintain FIFO delivery of messages. Note that this result relies on the assumption that the number of packets that can accumulate in the network is not bounded. Proof: To prove this theorem, we assume there is such a protocol and consider a schedule where R and S crash and then there are many T ransmit events but no further crashes.
After su ciently many T ransmits, there must be a Deliverm e v ent that matches the last Transmitm e v ent. We n o w use the stealing technique cf. the proof of Theorem 3.3 to steal and hide packets from , while still forcing Deliverm to occur. We then crash R and replay the packets we collected to cause R to erroneously deliver m again. The details follow.
Suppose in contradiction there is such a protocol. It has a nite ping-pong schedule Crash S Crash R that starts with Crash S and Crash R , resulting in system state c, then has tc + 1 unique Transmit events but no further crashes, and ends with a Deliver event to match the last Transmit event.
Let s 1 ; : : : ; s k be the sequence of packets sent b y S in . W e inductively build a schedule Crash S Crash R 1 1 1 : : : k k k as follows. Let i be the pre x of through the sending of s i .
Note that i has no Crash events in it. 
Non-Losing, but Non-FIFO, Networks
We n o w assume that the network never loses packets but might deliver them arbitrarily out of order. Under this assumption, FIFO exactly-once message transfer is not possible. Note that Theorem 4.3 does not imply this result, since that theorem relied on having a losing network; yet this result does not imply Theorem 4.3, since this result only shows the impossibility o f a FIFO protocol. In fact, as we discuss below, there does exist a non-FIFO protocol when the network does not lose packets. The impossibility can actually be shown for a very weak liveness condition. Proof: Suppose in contradiction that there is such a protocol. Let be a nite pingpong schedule that begins with Crash S Crash R and then contains a series of Transmit events, Transmitm 1 ; : : : ;T ransmitm j , ending with a Deliverm i for some i j. Let s 1 ; : : : ; s h be the sequence of packets sent from S to R in . I f R , starting in state rec R the state of R immediately following any Crash R event, receives these packets, it will mimic its behavior in and perform a Deliverm.
By Corollary 2.2 the pumping technique, pump ; k sender ; k i s a s c hedule at the end of which S and R are in the same states as they are at the end of and s 1 ; : : : ; s h are in transit.
We n o w show h o w to insert between pump ; k sender ; k and the later delivery of these packets the Transmit and Deliver for a distinct m 0 k , causing a violation of the FIFO property.
Let be a nite schedule that begins with Crash S Crash R and then contains a series of Transmit events, Transmitm 0 1 ; : : : ;T ransmitm 0 l , where m i 6 = m 0 h for all h, ending with a Deliverm 0 k for some k l.
Since starts with S and R crashing and the network is non-FIFO, it follows that pump ; k sender ; k is a schedule. Also, s 1 ; : : : ; s h are in transit after it. Hence, pump ; ksender ; k jR i s a s c hedule, and it has an extension in which only R takes steps that ends with Deliverm i . In this schedule, m i is transmitted before m 0 k , but delivered after m 0 k , which contradicts MT2 the FIFO property of the protocol.
The above theorem implies that, without stable storage, providing FIFO behavior for messages, when packets are not delivered in FIFO manner, is impossible in the presence of host crashes, even if the network does not lose packets and the protocol only has to deliver some messages. The above corollary holds even if the grace period is allowed to be unbounded. When the ordering properties of the protocol match those of the network, there is a simple protocol: Whenever Transmitm occurs, S sends a single packet with message m to R. Whenever R receives a packet from S, R performs the matching Deliver event. It is easy to see that this protocol guarantees 1 FIFO exactly-once message transfer on a FIFO non-losing network and 2 non-FIFO exactly-once message transfer on a non-FIFO non-losing network as well as 3 FIFO at-most-once message transfer on a FIFO losing network and 4 non-FIFO at-most-once message transfer on a non-FIFO losing network.
Bounded Capacity
In this subsection we assume that at any time, at most cap packets are in transit from S to R or vice versa, as will usually be the case when S and R are communicating directly over a p h ysical link. This constraint is modeled formally by restricting attention to schedules in which the Send and Lose events occur in such a w a y as to obey the capacity bound.
Our interest in this assumption was motivated by the observation that several impossibility results for message transfer rely on the ability to collect an unbounded number of packets in the network, including some in this paper e.g., 4.3 and one in 17 . In contrast, we n o w describe a crash-resilient exactly-once FIFO message transfer protocol for a FIFO losing network with bounded c apacity. The capacity is used by the protocol as an upper bound on the number of packets from old transmissions to make sure that every transmitted message is delivered. A similar idea was used in 1 ; however, their protocol dynamically maintains the upper bound on the numb e r o f p a c k ets in transit. Unfortunately, this upper bound grows exponentially during the execution of the protocol of 1 .
Our protocol has the pleasing property that the number of packets sent depends on the capacity only after a crash has occurred at S. Note that 2cap is an upper bound on the total number of packets that can be in transit in both directions.
As Transmit events occur at S, S stores the messages to be transferred in a bu er and deals with them in FIFO order. When recovering from a crash which of course will empty the bu er of pending messages, S repeatedly sends initializing packets start; 1 until it receives ack; 1; then, S repeatedly sends start; 2 until it receives ack; 2 and so on, until S repeatedly sends start; 2cap + 2 and receives ack; 2cap + 2. Only at this point, S starts to transfer messages out of its pending bu er as follows: To transfer a message m, S repeatedly sends packets m; 1 until it receives ack; 1; then, S repeatedly sends m; 2 until it receives ack; 2. Once ack; 2 is received, S is ready to send the next message m 0 in the same manner; that is, S sends m 0 ; 1 until it receives ack; 1; then, S sends m 0 ; 2 until it receives ack; 2. R acknowledges any incoming packet with header h by sending the packet ack; h. When R recovers from a crash, it rst waits while acknowledging incoming packets for a non-start packet with header 1. Only at this point, R starts to deliver messages as follows: R delivers a message m to its host only upon receiving m; 1 and immediately afterwards m; 2. Theorem 4.6 There exists a FIFO c r ash-resilient exactly-once message transfer protocol for a losing FIFO network, if a bound on the capacity of the network is known.
Proof: Consider the protocol just described.
We rst prove the following invariant for any s c hedule of the protocol: Whenever S begins to transfer message m, there is no old packet with header 1 in transit. This is true initially.
As long as no crashes occur, this continues to be true, since the network is FIFO.
A crash of R alone does not a ect the invariant since R acknowledges every packet it receives with the header in that packet. Now w e show that a crash of S does not a ect the invariant. Let c be the system state immediately after the last crash. Since the capacity is bounded, at most 2cap distinct packet headers are in transit between S and R in both directions in c. I f R has received a packet but not yet acknowledged it in state c, then at most one additional header could be sent b y R . T h us, there are at most 2cap+1 distinct packet headers that are in the system but are not known to S in c. Let D be this set of 2 cap+1 distinct headers and let lc be one of 2 cap+2 header values that is not in D.
Before S starts sending non-start messages after the last Crash, S sends packets with all possible header values and waits for acknowledgments. In particular, S also repeatedly sends start; lc and waits for ack; lc. S receives ack; lc only if R receives start; lc and sends ack; lc. By the FIFO property, when S receives ack; lc, all packets in transit have the header lc; moreover, from this point on, whenever S receives ack; h while sending packets with header h, all the packets in transit have the header h. This proves the correctness of the invariant.
Using the above w e prove that the requirement for message transfer hold. Consider a schedule of the protocol described above. We n o w de ne a function causem satisfying MT1 and MT2.
R performs Deliverm when it receives packet m; 2 immediately after receiving packet m; 1. S sends the packets m; 1 and m; 2 in response to a Transmitm e v ent. Let causem map this Deliver to this Transmit.
Consider two events Deliverm and Deliverm 0 , where Deliverm occurs before Deliverm 0 . Then R receives at least one m; 1 packet, followed by at least one m; 2 packet, followed by at least one m 0 ; 1 packet, followed by at least one m 0 ; 2 packet. Since the network is FIFO, S sends m; 1 packets and then m; 2 packets in response to some Transmitm event, and subsequently S sends m 0 ; 1 packets and then m; 2 packets in response to some subsequent T ransmitm 0 e v ent. Thus causem is one-to-one MT1 and FIFO MT2. We n o w show MT3. Assume that is fair, in nite, and has a nite number of Crash events.
Because of NA2, S never gets stuck sending the same packet forever, i.e., eventually it gets an acknowledgment for the current packet. We will show that every Transmitm e v ent occurring after the nal Crash has a matching Deliverm.
Suppose the last Crash is by R. Let Transmitm b e a n e v ent occurring after the last Crash. Then, eventually after the last crash, S starts sending m; 1 and then m; 2. Eventually R receives m; 2 and performs Deliverm.
Suppose the last Crash is by S. Let Transmitm b e a n e v ent after the last crash. S repeatedly sends m; 1 in response, and then repeatedly sends m; 2 once it receives ack; 1.
By the invariant proved above, this ack is a current a c k sent b y R , and not a leftover." Thus R actually received one of the current m; 1 packets and when R receives the rst m; 2 message afterwards, R will perform Deliverm.
There is even a bounded capacity protocol for non-FIFO networks; however it is more ine cient in that at least cap+1 packets must be sent to transfer each message. Cf. 4 .
Discussion
We h a v e studied the necessity of retaining information between incarnations and across node crashes for two aspects of the connection management problem: incarnation management and message transfer. We proved that when state information is not saved between incarnations, the problem is solvable if and only if the network is FIFO. We also showed that incarnation management is not possible in the presence of crashes without stable storage. Furthermore, we showed that message transfer is possible in the presence of crashes without stable storage when packets can be lost if and only if the network is FIFO and the protocol is allowe d a v ariable grace period after a crash during which it need not deliver messages. When packets are not lost, message transfer is possible if and only if either the network is FIFO or the protocol need not be. On the positive side, we h a v e devised a data link initialization procedure that can withstand node crashes without stable storage, provided that the capacity of the physical link is bounded.
Our work forms another step in formalizing issues that arise at the transport layer in communication protocols. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst theoretical study of this problem to incorporate the following practical features: indication of severe network misbehavior, grace period after a crash and bounded capacity of the physical links.
Many i n teresting issues remain to be studied, including ow control and bu ering, analysis of the time-based techniques used in practical connection management protocols, and problems that arise in trying to do a clean disconnect 14, 2 9 . We hope that our model, de nitions and techniques will be of help in continuing in these directions. In particular, we believe the NProblem action can be used to encapsulate timer-based mechanisms used to detect severe errors, by using an appropriate choice of predicates.
Another interesting aspect is to explore quantitative considerations such as the number of packets that have t o b e s e n t in the cases where incarnation management or message transfer is possible. For example, it would be interesting to know whether cap packets are required in order to clear the connection after a crash, when the network is FIFO and the capacity, cap, is bounded.
